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TWENTY YEARS OF REVISIONISM
H. FUKUI*
INTRODUCTION
It would seem most natural that the 1947 Constitution of Japan
should have been the target of strong revisionist pressure in the years
following its promulgation, considering its contents and the special
circumstances of its making. However, looking back upon the develop-
ments in this revisionist movement, one is struck by the degree of
ambivalence and confusion in the attitudes of both the proponents. and
opponents of revision and by the apparent failure of the former to
effect revision. It is my view that these two impressions are very inti-
mately interrelated and that an understanding of this relationship is
necessary if the issues involved are to be viewed in historical perspec-
tive. I also feel that it is helpful to focus on two broad aspects of the
revisionist movement, one relating to its typological composition and
ideological implications and the other to the nature and scope of its
support.
The first of these aspects involves a distinction between three types
of revisionism which are analytically separable but in reality overlap-
ping. The most common type calls for revision of one or more specific
provisions of the 1947 Constitution, other than Article 9, for technical,
rather than ideological, reasons. The second type, a variation of the
first, concerns specifically the most controversial article of the docu-
ment, Article 9. For purposes of our discussion it will be helpful to
distinguish these two types. At the same time, however, it should be
noted that both are pragmatically motivated.
The third type of revisionism differs from the first and the second
in that it aims at a total rewriting of the Constitution and springs from
an ideological and emotional basis. It questions the propriety and legit-
imacy of the manner in which the "MacArthur Constitution" was
drafted by Americans and "imposed" upon the Japanese government
and people. It is primarily concerned with defending the national
identity and traditional values of Japan against what is regarded as
an unwarranted and unjust interference by the occupation regime in
the determination of Japan's destiny.
The nature and scope of the support for each of these types of
* Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara.
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revisionism may be discussed at many different levels and in a variety
of contexts. Our attention will be focused on one particular level and
context, i.e., on the level of party politics as engaged in by the con-
servative side of the politcal spectrum. The parts played by public
opinion and the opposition parties and groups will be discussed only
to the extent that they are immediately relevant and useful to the
discussion thus focused.
As a preliminary step to the analytical discussion proposed above,
it may be helpful to review the historical and factual background and
the main characteristics of the revisionist movement.
I. THE REVISIONIST MOVEMENT
When the original text of the new Constitution of Japan was made
public on March 6, 1946, much dissatisfaction and criticism, as well as
joy and enthusiasm, were expressed in the nation's major newspapers.
For example, Yomiuri-Hichi Shimbun commented on what subse-
quently became Article 9 in an undisguised tone of criticism, declaring
that "the Japanese people would defend the nation's life and indepen-
dence at the cost of blood," if necessary.1 The greatly increased pow-
ers of the National Diet also came under fire as encouragement of
dictatorship by a majority and abuse of power by political parties.2
What was deemed excessive emphasis on the rights, and lack of em-
phasis on the duties, of the individual vis-A-vis society and the govern-
ment was criticized as typical of nineteenth rather than twentieth
century democracy.3 And some critics advocated proportional repre-
sentation in the upper house and the establishment of administrative
tribunals.'
The form and language of the text, as well as the manner in which
it had been drafted, were subjected to scathing criticism. Two readers
in Asaki Shimbun deplored the lack of precision and elegance in the
colloquial style Japanese used in the translation of the GHQ draft.
They noted the repetitiveness and diffuseness that resulted, especially
in the Preamble and Chapter IIIV Mitsu K6no, a member of the
Socialist Party's Central Executive Committee, and quite a few others
criticized the "undemocratic" and secretive manner in which the
Yomiuri-H6chi Shimbun, Mar. 8, 1946.
2 Tokyo Shimbun, April 21, 1946.
'Comments of Sakae Wagatsuma in Mainichi Shimbun, April 24, 1946.
'Mainichi Shimbun, Mar. 8, 1946.
Comments of Shbichi Sud6 and Masao Nakajima in Asahi Shimbun, April 24,
1946.
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Americans and their collaborators in the Japanese Cabinet had worked
on the matter.6
While much more cautious in tone, the opinions expressed by party
leaders both inside and outside the Diet also indicated a significant
amount of dissatisfaction. Obviously reflecting a desire to avoid offend-
ing SCAP, these opinions were self-consciously couched in generalities.
Interestingly, the Socialists seem to have found the GHQ draft far
more agreeable than did the Liberals and the Progressives. 7
Once the contents of the GHQ draft were made public, the leaders of
the conservative parties began to highly praise it. This no doubt indi-
cated the psychological pressure felt by them under the circumstances,
rather than a genuine change of heart. For example, Hatoyama in his
public comment on behalf of the Liberal Party stated that he was
greatly encouraged by the "maintenance of the Emperor system, safe-
guards for fundamental human rights, the renunciation of war and the
establishment of a democratic system of government" which charac-
terized both the GHQ draft and "the principles underlying our own
draft."' His subsequent behavior suggests, however, that he did not
really mean more than half of what he said. Of a similar nature was
the statement attributed to Takao Sait6, Chairman of the Executive
Council of the Progressive Party, in which he "welcomed" the pro-
visions relating to the Emperor and the renunciation of war.9
In the course of Diet deliberations, which lasted from June 25 to
October 7, 1946, the original text of the GHQ draft was revised in
several important respects. However, the most substantial of these
alterations were made at the initiative of GHQ, not of the Japanese
Diet members.10 In fact, the Japanese were responsible only for the
'Tokyo Shimbun ,Mar. 8, 1946.
"See Hitoshi Ashida's testimony in YEMP6-CH6SAKA1 DAI-7-xAI S5KAI GIJIROKU(The minutes of the 7th plenary session of the Commission on the Constitution) 117-
18 (1957). This is not to deny, however, that even the Socialists found some parts of
the GHQ draft objectionable; accordingly, they moved to amend it in the Diet.
'Mainichi Shimbun, April 3, 1946. See also Ichir6 K6no's comment in Yomiuri
Shimbun, April 2, 1946.
'Id. Another newspaper reminded its readers that Sait6 had declared at the pre-
vious extraordinary session of the Diet, in September 1945, that he would firmly
oppose democracy if it meant popular sovereignty. Tokyo Shimbun, April 7, 1946.
" The GHQ-inspired amendments included the following: A change in the phras-
ing of provisions relating to the people's sovereignty in the Preamble and Article 1;
addition of the words "education, property or income" in Article 44; insertion of the
guarantee of universal adult suffrage for the election of public officials in Article 15;
and insertion of the requirement that Cabinet ministers be civilians in Article 66.
For discussion concerning the origin and circumstances of these and other amend-
ments, see Kempd chuisakai hokokusho fuzoku bunsho No. 2 (Report of the Commis-
sion on the Constitution, Attached Document No. 2), KEmP5 cvrSAKAI, KEMP5 SEITEI
No KEri NI KANSURU SH6-IINKAI H6KOKUSHO (Commission on the Constitution, report
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vaguely qualifying phrases in the war-renouncing Article 9 and the
inclusion of several new articles in Chapter III. This meager achieve-
ment of the conservative-dominated Diet reflected the fact that an
effective purge program had cleared its membership of those prewar
and wartime leaders who would probably have been the most vocal
dissidents."
Considering the purge and the general political conditions prevailing
in the early part of the occupation, which naturally reduced drastically
the scope and range of Japanese initiative, the criticisms that were
voiced or implied in the course of the Diet deliberations were surpris-
ingly wide-ranging. Debate centered on the provisions relating to the
Emperor, the national polity, and the renunciation of war, but it ex-
tended also to other sections, especially those concerning the rights
and duties of the individual.12 If the points raised in the press and
elsewhere are taken into account, one may conclude that all the essen-
tial arguments which the revisionists were subsequently to employ in
support of their positions had been raised by the end of 1946.
These criticisms all arose from two basic, interrelated propositions:
(1) that the Constitution must be both practical and effective, and
(2) that it must be established by the Japanese people themselves and
must incorporate not only such universal principles as democracy and
freedom, but also the "unique" history, traditions, individuality and
national character of the Japanese nation.'" As we shall see later, the
first proposition provided the basis for the first two types of revision-
ism and the second for the third type of revisionism.
When the Japanese version of the original GHQ draft was approved
by the Diet and duly promulgated on November 3, 1946, debate on the
form and content of the Constitution ceased and did not resume until
the middle of 1950. There were several reasons for this almost com-
plete absence of revisionist agitation during the following three and a
half years. The fact of continuing occupation itself discouraged criti-
cism of the Constitution which had patently originated from GHQ.
of the debates at the Diet on constitutional revision), CH06K6ROR (No. 812) 75-80
(1964). See also, Y. Hoshino, Kempo kaisei o ineguru kokkai-gijiroku (The minutes
of the debates at the Diet on constitutional revision), CH06K6RON(No. 812) 75-80
(1956).
" SHOGIIN & SANGIIN (eds.), GIKAI-SEIDO SHICHIJU-NEN SHI: SEITO KAIHA HEN
(The history of the Diet system over seventy years: volume on political parties)
674, 680 (1961).
12 Kemnp6 chzsakai hokokusho fuzoku bunsho No. 2, supra note 10, at 480-96.
" KEMPO CHOSAKAI, KEMPO CHOSAKAI HOKOKUSHO (Report of the Commission on
the Constitution) 374-89 (1964).
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More specifically, the purge had excluded from public debate the most
outspoken critics of the occupation administration and, by inference,
of the new Constitution; their places had been filled by those who
benefitted in one way or another from the new system. Just as impor-
tant was the simple fact that the masses of the Japanese people were
generally too preoccupied with immediate economic problems to pay
much attention to the issue. On the other hand, those who were in-
terested in the new Constitution were still confident of the adequacy
of its provisions, regarding it as the symbol of a new and better Japan.
They were trying to understand the meanings and implications of its
novel provisions rather than to view them in a critical light. The pow-
erful nationalistic reaction which was to propel the most radical type
of .revisionism several years later was totally absent at this stage.
The only exceptions to the absence of revisionism during the period
before the Korean War were the responses of two academic groups to
the Far Eastern Commission's instruction (to review the actual opera-
tion of the new Constitution one year after promulgation) of October
1946. The K%5 kenkyfikai (Public law study association) proposed
amendments aimed at accentuating the democratic and pacifist aspects
of the new Constitution. It suggested that specific article be revised,
especially in Chapters I, II and III."4 Although the ideological moti-
vation behind the actions of this group is undeniable, it should never-
theless be emphasized that the amendments proposed were specific,
limited and intended primarily to reinforce or clarify the meanings of
the existing provisions. The Kemp&-kaisei no shomondai (Problems of
constitutional revision) published by the Kempj kenkyfikai (Consti-
tution study association, formed of Tokyo University professors of
law) was even more clearly technical and particular in its applica-
tion." Neither of these groups was concerned primarily with the
authorship of the 1947 Constitution, much less did they question its
basic legitimacy.
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 changed the situa-
tion completely. On July 8, MacArthur instructed the Japanese gov-
ernment to create a Police Reserve Force of 75,000 men and to in-
11Y. HASEGAWA, NIHOiN NO XEMnx'6 (The Constitution of Japan) 197-99 (1957).
21Id. See also N. KOBAYASHI, NIHoNKOKu-KEmP5 NO mONDAI-JKYO (The opera-
tional problems of the Constitution of Japan) 282-83 (1964), and T. Sakuma, Sengo
kaiken-sls5 no daka to shuy5-ronten (Movements for constitutional revision and
the principal problems), in KEmP6 CH6SAKAI SSHIHAN: EMP6 KAISEI MONDAI NO
HONSHITsU (Criticism on the Commission on the Constitution: the essence of the
constitutional revision problem) 145-46 (R. Arikura et al. eds. 1964).
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crease the Maritime Safety Agency force by 8,000 men.16 This action
began the inevitable development of the problem of reconciling re-
armament with Article 9. The original Police Reserve Force was re-
named the Safety Force two years later, and in June, 1954 the latter
became the Self-Defense Forces, made up of three full-fledged serv-
ices. It became increasingly difficult for the government and the minis-
terial party to avoid seriously considering an amendment of the war-
renouncing article." Thus it may be said that developments in the
Far East, particularly the establishment of the People's Republic of
China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War, provided the
objective basis of a reconsideration of Article 9.
The controversy in the Diet over the interpretation of Article 9
and the constitutionality of the Police Reserve Force and its succes-
sors reached a high point in the 13th session of 1952 during debate on
the Safety Agency Bill and the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and
again in the 19th session of 1954 during debate on the Self-Defense
Forces Bill. 8 The revisionist pressure generated by the controversy
over the Self-Defense Forces had as its central and direct concern the
single particular article. Nevertheless, it almost inevitably gave rise to
a much more radical and sweeping type of revisionism based on
ideological beliefs and emotionalism, rather than considerations of
practical needs. This latter brand of revisionism quickly engulfed and
absorbed the Article 9-centered revisionism.
The occasion for the emergence of the movement for total revision,
or rather rewriting, of the 1947 Constitution was provided by the
return to public life of the once purged bureaucrats and politicians.
In the April 1952 House of Representatives election these prewar and
wartime leaders managed to win a total of 139 seats, accounting for
33 percent of the Liberal and 37 percent of the Progressive members
in the new House.' " Included were many potentially outspoken critics
of the new Constitution who had been forced into silence by the purge
"Y. Oka, Gendai-nihon-seiji ni okerit gai-atsut hanno(Reaction of the politics to
exterior pressures in the contemporary Japan), in GENDAI-NIHON NO SEIJI-KATEI
(Y. Oka ed. 1958).
17 For a general review of the developments involved see id. at 35-44, and Y. Oka.
Seiji (Politics), in 2 SENGO NIHON SH6SHI (A short history of postwar Japan) 330-53
(T. Yanaibara ed. 1960).
s For a concise review of the controversy and the major arguments exchanged in
the Diet on the subject, see KOKURITSU KOKKAI TOSHOKAN CHOSA RIPPO KOSA KYOKU
(ed.) REFARENSU BUNKEN YOMOKU DAI-4-SHC: KEMPO-RON 8-19 (1965). More inti-
mate personal observations are available in S. HAYAsHI, H6SEI-KYOKC-CH6KAN
SEIKATSU NO OMOIDE 83-84 (1966).
" Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 3, 1952; and MAINICHI NENKAN 149 (1954).
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program. They distrusted and hated the new Constitution not only
because of their disagreement with its specific provisions but, probably
more importantly, because they felt that they had been unfairly barred
under duress from expressing their views when it had been voted
through the Diet and "imposed" upon the nation under GHQ's pres-
sure. It was characteristic of this type of revisionism that it derived
its emotional drive directly from personal experience and resentment.
This was true particularly of the views expressed at the time by men
like Hatoyama and Ishibashi.2 0
While the fact of Japan's rearmament presented a pratical and
concrete case for an amendment of Article 9, the emotionalism intro-
duced by the massive "come-back" of the prewar leaders gave rise
to controversies over the origin and legitimacy of the Constitution
itself.
In the following few years several groups were formed among poli-
ticians and ideologues to transform their aspirations for total rewriting
of the new Constitution into an organized movement. A series of re-
visionist publications followed. In September 1953, some fifty leaders
of right-wing groups adopted a resolution calling for the outright
scrapping of the Constitution. Immediately thereafter, Hatoyama per-
suaded Prime Minister Yoshida to establish a committee in the Liberal
Hatoyama wrote:
I had always thought, both during and after the war, that the Americans were
capable of doing most outrageous things at the same time that they professed
belief in justice and freedom, and for that reason I had a certain amount of
contempt for them. I was therefore not particularly surprised when they desig-
nated me a purgee. I just thought that they had acted according to type.
I. HATOYAMA, HATOYAMA ICHIR5 KAIKOPOKU (Reminiscences of Hatoyama Ichir5
49-50 (1957). The same sentiment had been earlier expressed by Tanzan Ishibashi,
when he wrote:
However it may have been, it is clear that not all actions on the part of the
high-ranking officials of the Occupation Forces were fair and just. Examples of
unfair treatment can be found in the manner in which the Purge program was
actually executed. One of such examples was my own case. For reasons not
known to myself, the Government Section of the GHQ began to maneuver for my
purge in early 1947.... When the (screening) committee extablished by the Jap-
anese government finally decided against my designation on May 2, 1947, the Chief
of the Government Section, Whitney, sent a memorandum dated May 7 to the Jap-
anese government in which he demanded my removal on the grounds that I had
been editor and president of Tiya keizai shimposha, irrespective of the decision
previously made by the latter. The government succumbed to this pressure and
designated me at last on the 17th of the same month.... I do not think that the
intentions of the United States to democratise Japan were wrong, I believe,
however, that the United States herself was not entirely democratic.... The
dictatorial men of power of the Occupation... would not admit of a single criti-
cism of their own actions, and yet they were 'biazenly self-righteous as to
insist that they had bestowed upon the Japanese the freedom of speech....
T. Ishibashi, Hambei-kania hassei no riya (The reason why the anti-American
feeling has arisen), CHO6K6RO N (No. 781) 42-43 (1953).
1968 ]
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Party to deal specifically with the issue of constitutional revision.2 1
By early 1954 not only the Liberal Party but also the Progressive
Party had established a formal committee on the Constitution, which
in the months following prepared for publication basic outlines of
revision." In the meantime, both parliamentary and nonparliamentary
revisionist groups were formed, such as the Jishu-kempd kisei giin
dimei (Diet members league for the establishment of an independent
constitution), Jishu-kempj kisei ddmei (League for the establishment
of an independent constitution) and Jishu-kemp kisei seinen dimei
(Youth league for the establishment of an independent constitution).
These groups published a series of aggressively revisionist material.2 3
At the party level the Democratic Party, which resulted from the
November 1954 merger of the Progressive Party and the anti-Yoshida
groups in the Liberal Party, was the most articulate advocate of this
third type of revisionism. The policy program (seisaku-taikj) adopted
at its inaugural meeting called not only for a general reconsideration
of the 1947 Constitution in light of the "circumstances of its estab-
lishment and experience in practice," but more specifically for the
creation in the Diet of a commission on the Constitution.24 In the
"outline of the basic policies", (kihon-seisaku taikd) subsequently
ratified by the party's Executive Council and accepted by the Hato-
yama Cabinet on December 14, 1954, this call was repeated, together
with a parallel call for more adequate defense arrangements.2 5
Yet Hatoyama, once elected Prime Minister, was not as insistent
or as enthusiastic as he previously had been on the issue of constitu-
tional revision. In fact, his attitude became so cautious and circum-
spect that he was charged with having reversed his stand by Socialist
and Liberal opponents in the Diet.26 However, Ichir6 Kiyose and
others in the Democratic Party began to voice an extremist view,
2 A useful chronology of relevant events during this period is available in
Chikiij4-shiry5: nihionkoku-kempo kCfu-go 15-nen no chOkanzu (A bird's eye view
over the fifteen years after the promulgation of the constitution of Japan: section by
section materials) 238-51, a special issue of H6RITSU JIH6 (1961).
-JIYCT6 KEMPo-CHOSAKAI, NIHoNKOxu-KEiP6 KAISEI-AN Y6KO-AN (Outline of the
proposed revision of the Constitution of Japan) (Nov. 5, 1954) ; KAISHINT6, KAISHINT6
KEMIP6-CH6SAKAI HOKOKUSHO: GENK6-KEMPO NO MAONDAITEN NO GAIYO (Report of the
Committee on the Constitution of the Progressive Party: Outline of the problems
inherent in the present Constitution) (1955).
' KoKURITSU KOKKAI TOSHOKAN CHOSA RIPP6 KOSA KYOKU (ed.), supra note 18,
at 16-19; Sakuma, supra note 15, at 147.
'Y. MIYAIMOTO, SHIN-HOSHUT6 SHI (History of the new conservative parties)
370-71 (1962).
SId. at 384-85.
' See his exchanges with Taketora Ogata of the Liberal Party and J6tar6 Kawa-
kami of the Right Socialist Party on January 23, 1955, in the plenary meeting; and
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according to which the new Constitution was null and void because of
the peculiar circumstances of its making." So the Hatoyama Cabinet
proceeded in the summer of 1955 to introduce in the Diet a bill estab-
lishing a Cabinet Commission on the Constitution. After an initial
failure in the Special Diet Session of March-July 1955, this bill was
finally passed about a year later under the Third Hatoyama Cabinet.28
The merger, in November 1955, of the two conservative parties, the
Liberal and Democratic, in a sense represented the culmination of the
revisionist upsurge. The most dynamic proponent of the merger scheme
was Bukichi Miki. He declared in a public statement in the spring
of 1955 that the merger was conceived primarily as a means to
achieve constitutional revision. 9 Revision, of the third type, was
naturally included in the original platform of the Liberal-Democratic
Party (LDP) as one of its six basic policy objectives.3" In December
1955, Ogata, then a member of the initial four-man Presidential Proxy
Committee (sisai daik8 iinkai) of the party, referred to constitu-
tional revision as a principal objective of the unified party." Half a
year later, Kishi, the Secretary-General, appealed to the heads of the
party's Prefectural Federations to work for conservative control of
a two-thirds majority in the forthcoming House of Councillors election
in order to make constitutional revision feasible.2 In the meantime,
a party committee on the Constitution was established with a view
toward preparing a provisional draft of a revision by May 1956.11
In reality, however, the LDP committee on the Constitution never
with Orinoshin Tanaka of the Left Socialist Party on March 22 in the committee
on the budget of the House of Representatives. Asahi Shimbun, Jan. 24, 1955, and
Mainichi Shimbun, Mar. 23, 1955.
In his reply to Hisatada Hirose in the plenary meeting of the House of Coun-
cillors in July 1955, Ichir6 Kiyose, then President of the House and Chairman of
the Democratic Party Policy Affairs Research Council, stated that the writing of
the new Constitution by GHQ contravened the terms of the Hague Conventions and
point 3 of the Atlantic Charter. He also argued that it violated the spirit of Article
75 of the Imperial Constitution of Japan which prohibited revision of the Imperial
Constitution during a period of regency. See DAI-22-KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN KAIGIROKU
(Minutes of debates in the 22nd session of the House of Councillors) (No. 32) 3-5
(July 4, 1955). The same view had been expressed by Hatoyama three months earlier.
Asahi Shimbun, Mar. 30, 1955. For a more general discussion of similar and opposing
views on this subject, see KempO ch~sakai hkokusho fuokleu bunsho No. 10 (Report
of the Commission on the Constitution, Attached Document No. 10), KEawP cH6SAKAI
TOKUBETSU BUKAl, KEMPo MUK6-RON NI KANSURU HOKOKUSHO (Report on the argu-
ment that the present constitution is void) (1964).
"For background information, see KEmP6 CH6SAKAI, supra note 13, at 5-19.
Asahi Shimbun, April 19, 1955.
'JIAINTr-SnI HENSAN IINKA, JIYOMINSHaUT6-SHI (History of the Liberal-
Democratic Party) 22-23 (1961).
" Asahi Shimbun, Dec. 4, 1955, and Dec. 20, 1955 (evening ed.).
'Id., June 5, 1956 (evening ed.).
"Id., Nov. 29, 1955 (evening ed.) ; id., Dec. 24, 1955.
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produced such a draft. Moreover, in July 1956 its chairman, Iwao
Yamazaki, explicitly accepted the proposal of the party executive
that all concrete preparations for revision should be left entirely to the
Cabinet Commission on the Constitution and that the party commit-
tee's work should be confined to the education of the public and dis-
semination of relevant information. 4 Accordingly, although it was
not officially dissolved, the committee ceased to function after the
middle of 1956 and remained inactive until early 1961.
The growth of militant revisionism in the wake of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty provoked those committed to the defense of the 1947
Constitution to react just as violently. In August 1953, a loose organ-
ization of anti-revisionist intellectuals and their sympathizers was
formed under the name of Heiwa-kempd y(go no kai (Association
for the defense of the pacifist constitution) to oppose the government
moves towards rearmament.3 6 In January 1954, a much broader and
better organized anti-revisionist front appeared when some 135 "dem-
ocratic" organizations gathered to build a Kempi y5go kokumin rengi
(National federation for the defense of the Constitution).3
The political parties of opposition also were mobilized. The reaction
of the Japan Communist Party may well have been tactical rather
than fundamental in view of its public commitment to "abolition of
the Emperor system and establishment of a democratic republic."3
The opposition of the Socialists seems to have been much more con-
sistent and basic despite the obvious differences in emphasis between
right and left wings prior to the merger of October 1955." 9 Their
" Id.. July 27, 1956.
'The last few pages of Seisaku Geppi, the official monthly organ of the LDP
Policy Affairs Research Council, contains a record of the activities of various sub-
divisions of the organ. The first sixty-one issues (Feb. 1956 to Feb. 1961), however,
did not refer to a single meeting or any other form of activity of the Committee on the
Constitution.
"See the statements of the organization reprinted in 1 SHIRY6 SENGO 20-NEN
SHI: SEIJI (Materials relevant to the history over twenty years after the war: poli-
tics) 105 (K. Tsuji ed. 1966).
'Id. at 104-05, quoted from GOKENRENG6 JIMUKYOKU, GOKENRENGO SH6SHI (A
short history of the National Federation for the Defense of the Constitution) (1965).
'Shin-k6ry6 (New platform), in Akahata, July 15, 1952. According to this
proposal, the Emperor would be replaced by a President elected for a term of four
years, the National Diet would be unicameral, the minimum ages of electors and
candidates in a Diet election would be lowered to eighteen, the entire nation would
constitute a single unified constituency, and proportional representation would be
introduce l. The Japan Communist Party has played, however, a leading role in the
anti-revisionist movement. See NIKKAN R6D6 TSCI5HIN-SHA (ed.), SENrO NIHON
KY6SANSHUGI-UND6 SHI (The history of the communists' activities in Japan after
the war) 570-89 (1955).
" Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 1952; id., May 2, 1953; Mainichi Shimbun, Oct. 15,
1954.
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anti-revisionist position was officially confirmed in the policy program
of the unified Socialist party and subsequently led to concrete actions
both inside and outside the Diet under the direction of the party's
special committee on the defense of the Constitution (Kempi-yigo
tokubetsu-iinkai) *4 The anti-revisionists' goal was achieved at least
temporarily when they succeeded in winning over one-third of the seats
in the House of Councillors in 1956.
In the middle of 1957, the Commission on the Constitution began
to function, despite the refusal of the Socialists to participate. There-
after, the main arena of revisionist argumentation and agitation moved
to the Commission from the parties and private groups.41 Constituting
an overwhelming majority in the Commission, the revisionist party
politicians and academic ideologues worked hard to turn it into an
effective and authoritative pressure group for their cause.42 However,
due to the persistent resistance put up by a small but determined anti-
revisionist group, including the Commission Chairman Kenz6 Taka-
yanagi, and probably more importantly to the divisions and confusion
among the revisionists themselves, it became increasingly evident that
the revisionists were not in a position to dictate easily to the Commis-
sion's entire membership.
Coinciding with the failure of the revisionists in the Commission
was the remarkable decline of interest in the revision issue by the
LDP leadership. This was particularly so after Ikeda took over from
Kishi as the party's President in 1960. When towards the end of 1961
militant revisionists in the party attempted to force the party leaders
to 'adopt a much more unequivocally revisionist stand in the upper
house election campaigns, their demand was turned down firmly.43 It
has since become more and more apparent that the extreme revisionists
of the third type have become a very small minority in the LDP.
Moreover, revisionism in general has lost much of its earlier glamour
" NIHON'-SAKAIT6 SHI (The history of the Japan Socialist Party) 33-39 (K. Yao
ed. 1962) Nihon-shakait6 t6itsu taikai jumbi iinkai, Nihon-shakait6 k3ryO: und
hoshin seisaku taiki (The platform of the Japan Socialist Party: the outline of its
policies and guide for its activities) 87 (Oct. 13, 1955); Nihon-shakait6 hombu,
Kokumin-unda ni kansuriu hikokusho (A report on the anti-revision activities by citi-
zens) in DAI-14-KAI TEIKI-TAIKAI TO6MU HOKOKUSHO (No. 2) 5-10.
41 For a succinct review of the Commission's activities, see Ward, The Commnis-
sion on the Constitution and Prospects for Constitutional Change in Japan, 24 J.
AsrAx STUDIES 401-29 (1965).
'2 R. Kuroda, Chfakan-hakokusho ni arawareta chosakai no shiso (The ideology
prevailing in the Commission on the Constitfition which appeared in its interim
report), in KEMPO-CHOSAKAI S6HIRAN: KEMP6-KAISEI-MONDAI NO HONSHITSTJ 102-15
(R. Arikura ed. 1964).
' Asahi Shimbun, Dec. 26, 1961. See also Kappatsn ni narn jihninht kemp7-
chfsakai, in SEKAI, 203-07 (March 1963).
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and drive. By 1966 the only effectively organized revisionist groups
were the 100-member quasi-faction in the LDP, the soshinkai, and the
diffuse and rather ineffective movement led by Yasuhiro Nakasone,
calling for a change in the method of election and powers of the Prime
Minister.4 The latter calls for a partial, rather than a total, revision.
Thus in the years since the formation of the LDP, ostensibly aimed
at unifying revisionist efforts, revisionism and particularly its most
radical form has declined rather than prospered. This has happened
despite the fact that a few organized revisionist groups have been
formed during this period. To explain this somewhat paradoxical situa-
tion we must now turn to an analysis of the logical structure and
ideological basis of each type of revisionism.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE THREE TYPES OF REvISIONISM
The type of revisionism which the two groups of university profes-
sors advocated during the occupation period was above all pragmatic,
technical and specific. It aimed at amending one or more particular
provisions in the 1947 Constitution without questioning, much less
repudiating, its legitimacy and basic principles. Common sense would
suggest that this type of revisionism would be the one most likely to
arise under any circumstances and least likely to encounter strong
objections. It is highly suggestive that the first expressions of this kind
of revisionism should have come from "progressive" academics rather
than "reactionary" bureaucrats or politicians." Whether concerned
with the functions of the Emperor, the relationship between the free-
doms of the individual and public welfare, the nature and status of the
House of Councillors, the method of designating the Prime Minister,
judicial review, or the powers of local public entities, these revisionists
were interested above all in practical problems.
It is doubtful that this type of revisionism would have encountered
intense emotional or ideological opposition had it not been engulfed
and drowned in the successive waves of the second and third types of
revisionism. In fact, it is probable that some of the specific and limited
amendments suggested by the proponents of this brand of revisionism
would have proved acceptable even to the intellectuals who became
staunch opponents of revisionism as it has subsequently developed.
For example, most, if not all, members of the anti-revisionist group
" See H. Fukui, The Liberal-Democratic Party and Constitutional Revision, in
PAPERS ON MODERN JAPAN 1968 at 40-41 (D. Sissons ed. 1968).
"* K~hL-kenk3,lkai included among others, Professors Susumu Isoda, Masao
Maruyama, Hajime Nakamura, and Kiyoaki Tsuji.
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of university professors in Kempi-mondai kenkyfkai (Constitutional
problem study group) would probably not object to revision of a few
particular articles. Discussing Article 29 and the question of the pri-
vate ownership of property in a book recently published by the group,
Shigeto Tsuru candidly concludes that the provision under review is
"old-fashioned" and subject to re-examination.46 Similarly, Akira
Nakamura questions the definition of the status of the National Diet
as "the sole law-making organ," while Hy6ei Ouchi frankly declares
that the present constitution someday should be revised so that it may
be made more "humane."47 It is also well known that Chairman Taka-
yanagi and Vice-Chairman Yabe of the Commission on the Constitu-
tion were, despite their resistence to the revisionists in the Commis-
sion, interested respectively in adding a new provision or provisions
concerning the "elector's rights" and generally strengthening the pres-
ent Chapter III.48 In any event, 'it is clear that most opponents of
the revisionist movement have been primarily opposed to the second
and the third types outlined above, which have been trumpeted by
conservative politicians and their academic supporters.
It was difficult to gain organized support for the first type of revis-
ionism because the amendments desired were so various and particu-
lar. It was virtually impossible to bring the sponsors of these amend-
ments together to form a solid organized group. The two academic
groups mentioned above involved no more than a few dozen university
professors who may well have disagreed among themselves as to the
priorities of the specific amendments proposed. In this respect, the
piecemeal type of revisionism differed considerably from advocacy of
or opposition to the revision of the controversial Article 9 of the entire
Constitution, either of which would present a clear-cut choice. For this
reason it was logically and practically impossible to build a "move-
ment" in support of this most common-sensical type of revisionism and
to prevent it from being submerged completely in the more powerful
forms of revisionism which followed.
The second type of revisionism was primarily concerned with the
practical need for amending Article 9, a need which originally arose
from limited Japanese rearmament under pressure applied from Wash-
ington at the outbreak of the Korean War. The motivation of its pro-
ponents was simple. They believed that armed forces were essential
"I KEMP6-mONDAI KENKYoKAI (ed.), KEMP5 TOKUHON (Readings on the Con-
stitution) at 194 (1965).
7 2 id. at 30, 84.
" Yomiuri Shimbun, May 3, 1953.
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to the survival and welfare of the Japanese people in contemporary
international relations, characterized by tensions and conflicts between
opposing ideologies, nations and blocs of nations. Thus, they called
for the amendment of Article 9 with a view to legitimizing and
strengthening the Self-Defense Forces. Prime Minister Hatoyama
stated in March 1955 that it was "most unreasonable that Japan
should be required to refrain from maintaining her own armed forces."
He proposed to change the controversial article.4 9 The same view
was echoed later by Hosokawa and Uemura in the Commission on the
Constitution, both of whom found Article 9 unacceptable in its present
form.50
Another practical consideration which contributed to the growth of
this type of revisionism was the prospect for substantial defense con-
tracts which large numbers of manufacturers hoped would materialize
as a result of rearmament.
To the extent that the call for large-scale rearmament was predi-
cated on a particular view of communism and its alleged aggressive
designs, or tinged with patriotic concern for Japan's status in the
community of nations, the motivation of the revisionists of this cate-
gory was no doubt in part ideological. It is nevertheless important to
emphasize that an ideological repudiation of the "occupation regime"
and the basic principles of the new Constitution was not necessarily
involved. In other words, a partial and specific revision of the war-
renouncing article alone was sought.
In considering the nature and scope of support available to this
type of revisionism, it should first be noted that public opinion on the
issue of Article 9 and rearmament had two interesting aspects. On the
one hand, the pacifism represented and popularized by Article 9 rap-
idly developed into a popular cult. Pacifism became the object of
fervent devotion among large numbers of Japanese. It became deeply
instilled in their hearts incomparably faster than did any of the demo-
cratic principles of government also proclaimed by the new Constitu-
tion. During and immediately following World War II, the people of
Japan experienced destruction, hunger and death directly, physically
and personally, not just abstractly and intellectually. Thus, the post-
war Japanese were emotionally devoted to the ideal of peace at almost
any cost.
On the other hand, many Japanese realistically knew that Japan
" KOBAYASHI, supra note 15, at 304.
' Id.
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could not be entirely secure without arms and soldiers, especially when
every nation in the world except Japan was armed. When the war
broke out in Korea, it was thought that belligerent communist powers
were bent on aggression against their weaker neighbors. Thus, while
the people of Japan were emotionally devoted to the idea of a world
without arms or fighting in which their experience of the last war
would never be repeated, reason and "reality" seemed to point to the
need for arms as insurance against unprovoked aggression.
This dilemma is illustrated by the results of two public opinion
polls taken by Asahi Shimbun in November 1950, some five months
after the war started in Korea. An overwhelming majority (80 per-
cent) of those polled supported the United Nations, and yet refused
to endorse Japan's contributions involving military means to the "UN"
actions in Korea.51 Most Japanese preferred to avoid military in-
volvement even under the banner of the United Nations. However,
Japan's rearmament was favored 54 percent to 28 percent, provided
that the arms would only be used for the defense of Japan.52 This
paradoxical division between opposition to Japan's involvement in
military engagements in any circumstances short of defense against
direct attack and the gefierally favorable attitude toward rearmament,
probably short of acquisition of nuclear weapons, has persisted. For
example, a Yomiuri Shimbun survey of September 1964 disclosed that
76 percent of those polled supported rearmament for purposes of self-
defense; 13 percent were in opposition.5" On the other hand, an Asahi
Shimbun poll one year later concerning the war in Vietnam showed
just as conclusively that a majority (75 percent) were opposed to the
United States bombing of North Vietnam for no other reason but that
it would lead to the spread of the war and might threaten to involve
Japan.5 4
The contradictory tendencies among the Japanese masses revealed
by the results of these public opinion surveys have produced appar-
ently illogical and paradoxical attitudes at the level of practical poli-
tics. The Self-Defense Forces have been progressively developed both
in the numerical size and equipment without encountering effective
organized resistance. On the other hand, public support for the revi-
C For relevant information on the polls, see 5 SHIRY6 SENGO 20-NEN SHI: SHAKAI
(Materials relevant to the history over twenty years after the war: society) 83-85
(I. Shimizu ed. 1966).
"'For similar results of another survey taken two-and-a-half years later, see
Asahi Shimbun, June 22, 1953.
'Yomiuri Shimbun, Sept. 7, 1964.
"Asahi Shimbun, Aug. 24, 1965.
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sion of Article 9 has remained unimpressive, particularly since 1955
when the Liberal-Democratic Party was formed.55 This situation sug-
gests that Article 9 is now a symbol and catharsis for the popular
pacifist sentiment, and therefore is much less vulnerable to revisionist
pressure than the substantial support for rearmament would lead one
to expect.
This paradox has been further complicated by the continued dom-
ination of the government by the conservative parties. Under these
circumstances rearmament naturally meant more than maintenance of
armed forces of an entirely neutral character. Japan's military forces
are closely tied to the United States military alliance system against
Japan's communist neighbors. Rearmament under these conditions
was particularly objectionable to those who wanted to see Japan im-
prove, rather than worsen, her relations with those neighbors. It is
worth pointing out that in the period under review here an overwhelm-
ing majority of Japanese citizens favored closer and friendlier relations
with these nations, especially with China, including the normalization
of diplomatic relations."
Despite the presence of the powerful emotional drag suggested
above, the movement for the revision of Article 9 might have enjoyed
a somewhat better chance of success had it received sustained organ-
ized support from the conservative parties or the business community.
However, neither was a reliable source of support, partly because
rearmament proceeded rather smoothly. No formal amendment of
Article 9 proved necessary. Moreover, as we shall later discuss in
some detail, this type of revisionism, like the first, was soon made
impossible by the emotion-charged movement for total revision.
There is little doubt that it was MacArthur's New Year's Day mes-
sage of 1950, and his blunt demand for the creation of the Police
Reserve Force in July of the same year, which gave rise to the contro-
versy over the revision of Article 9.57 It is important, however, to note
that his call for rearmament did not ask for a formal amendment of
that article. It was explicitly predicated on the assumption that Article
9 did not deprive Japan of her right to self-defense and therefore she
could rearm without violating the constitutional injunction.5 8 Subse-
SFor a pertinent discussion and tabulation of the trends in public opinion, see
KOBAYASHI, supra note 15, at 312-14, 406-07.
'"For example, in early 1960, 75% favored and only 5% opposed the normalization
of diplomatic relations with China. See Asahi Shimbun, Jan. 22, 1960.
", Sakuma, supra note 15, at 146.
'The text of MacArthur's New Year's Day message is available in 1 SHIRY6
SENGo 20-NEN SHI: sEaii, supra note 36, at 65-66.
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quently, Yoshida and his followers in the Liberal Party refrained
from officially subscribing to this interpretation. They insisted instead
that the "forces" and "war potential" mentioned in the article referred
only to armed forces capable of fighting a modern war. The Police
Reserve and Self-Defense Forces, as far as they were concerned,
lacked such capability and therefore could not be regarded as con-
travening Article 9.59
In the meantime, the Progressives, who were generally much more
outspoken in their advocacy of rearmament and constitutional revi-
sion, evidenced their serious interest in the issue by establishing a
special party committee on defense (bjei tokubetsu-iinkai) in July
1953.60 At about the same time, such leaders of the party as Hitoshi
Ashida and Ichir6 Kiyose began to echo publicly MacArthur's view
that rearmament for self-defense was compatible with Article 9.1
When Hatoyama replaced Yoshida as Prime Minister he followed this
interpretation, explaining that maintenance of forces necessary for
the adequate defense of Japan was constitutional under the existing
Article 9, whether or not capable of effective employment in modern
warfare. 2
The attitude of a segment of the business community changed along
with that of the conservative parties. Its interest in the possibilities
of lucrative military production, dramatically awakened by enormous
"special procurement orders" (amounting to over $2 billion in 1951-
53).received from United States armed forces during the Korean
War, 3 led it to encourage large-scale and speedy rearmament in the
years following. Efforts were channeled in particular through the
Keizai-kyjryoku kondankai (Forum for economic cooperation) of
Keidanren (Federation of economic organizations).64 Under the pres-
t' KOKURITSU KOKKAI TOSHOICAN cH6SA roPP5 KOSA KYOKU (ed.), sipra note 18,
at 10; Y. Hoshino, KempC7-rons5 no 15-iten (Fifteen years of constitutional contro-
versies), in H5tiTsU-JiH6, supra note 21, at 17.
Asahi Shimbun, July 24, 1953; id., Aug. 14, 1953.Id., April 6, 1953.
2KOKURITSU KOKKAI TOSHOKAN CHOSA RIPP5 KOSA KYOKU (ed.), supra note 18,
at 10-11.
'H. Ouchi, Keizai, in 1 SENGO NINON SH6SHI (A short history of postwar Japan)
122-30 (T. Yanaibara ed. 1960).
"The Forum was originally established in February 1951 as a nichi-bei keizai-
teikei kondankai (forum for U.S.-Japan economic cooperation) and was reorganized
in August 1952 into a body with three working committees-s4gi-seisaku (general
policy), bjei-seisan (defense production), and ajiya fiekkcl kaihatsu (Asian recon-
struction and development). Of these the defense production committee played a lead-
ing role subsequently as a semi-official link between the government and business in the
planning and execution of the defense build-up programs. In February 1953, it pro-
duced a "Keidanren plan" of rearmament, according to which Japan would be equipped
within the next six years with a land force of 15 divisions and 300,000 men; a marl-
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sure and with the advice of this group, especially its defense pro-
duction committee (Btei-seisan iinkai), organized research in the
guided missile field was initiated in 1954, production of jet fighters
(F-86-F and T-33-A) was officially started in 1955, and a joint de-
fense production liaison council (Bdei-seisan renraku kydgikai) was
established in 1956 to coordinate the views and efforts of the govern-
ment, the LDP and industry."
However, the enthusiasm of big business for rearmament and de-
fense orders was increasingly divorced from the revisionist movement.
As de facto rearmament became more widely accepted not only by the
conservative party politicians but also by the press and even by the
Supreme Court,60 the businessmen became markedly less articulate
regarding the issue of constitutional revision. It is possible that they
continued to regard the revision of Article 9 as a desirable goal, if
revision could be achieved without too much sacrifice. They apparently
ceased, however, to consider revision essential and imperative. As long
as substantial defense contracts were forthcoming without a formal
amendment of the article, they found no compelling reason why they
should deliberately identify themselves with a not so popular cause.
As suggested earlier, the third type of revisionism called for total
rewriting of the 1947 Constitution to achieve more conformity with
the unique (or peculiar) traditions of Japan, especially the "national
polity," symbolized by the Emperor system. In the beginning this line
of ideological revisionism was propounded mainly by purged former
bureaucrats, particularly those from the prewar Ministry of Home
Affairs. Its intensely ideological and emotional character was subse-
quently inherited by a small group of academic ideologues in the Corn-
time force of 290,000 tons and 70,000 men; and an air force of 3,750 aircraft and 130,-
000 men. In August 1954, it distributed a pamphlet entitled Jieigumbi hoji no hitsuy5
to bili-seisan no motsu vakuwari (The need for the maintenance of self-defense forces
and the role of defense production), which emphasized more vigorously than ever the
need for adequate rearmament. See 2 T. HORIKOSHI (ed.), KEIZAI DANTAI RENGOKAI
J0NEN-SHI (The history of the Federation of Economic Organizations over the past
10 years) 566-647 (1963).
'Id. at 631-32.
' In its controversial Sunakawa decision of December 16, 1959, 13 Saik6saibansho
Keiji hanreishfi 3225, the Supreme Court avoided passing on the constitutionality
of Japan's rearmament in relation to Article 9. It held, however, that Article 9 did
not require Japan to be entirely defenseless, recognizing her right to self-defense.
The Court thus legitimized by inference the presence and possible expansion of the
Self-Defense Forces. See Saikisai o meguru hi to seiji, a special issue of H6RITSU
jiii6 (1960); Sunawgaza-jiken jfkokushin hanketsu tokushl, a special issue of JURI-
SUTO (1960); K. TSuNET6, Heiwa-kemp6 to saikt5sai no shimei, SEKAI 20-30 (Feb.
1960) ; S. Unno, Na-e kempi 9-jo no kaishaku o saketa ka, at 31-36; N. Ukai, 15 tai
0 e no ginion, CHO&K6RON, (No. 867) 72-91 (1960).
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mission on the Constitution and still more recently by the leaders of
the soshinkai in the LDP.
Precisely because of the primarily ideological and emotional appeal
of this type of revisionism, it enjoyed briefly a degree of popularity
in post-independence Japan. However, since this type of revisionism
would, if carried to its logical conclusion, upset the whole postwar
framework of the nation's political and social organization and beha-
vior, it was fundamentally unacceptable not only to the conservative
"progressive" parties, such as the Socialists, but also to the conserva-
tive but not reactionary LDP politicians and their supporters. Above
all it was unacceptable to the wide-ranging groups of nonaffiliated
citizens who were benefiting in one way or another from the postwar
changes symbolized by the new Constitution. Thus, from the viewpoint
of either party politics or public opinion, chances for success of this
type of revisionism were slight from the beginning.
The character and scope of the support total revision did enjoy,
however, was much more varied and complex than was the case with
either of the other types of revisionism. One of its outstanding charac-
teristics was the prominence of former high-ranking bureaucrats in
the leadership group of the movement. In fact, the early revisionist
groups were almost exclusively composed of these bureaucrats. For
example, the group which met in November 1953 consisted of seven
former officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs and three former
officials of the Ministry of Finance currently affiliated with the Liberal
Party. In addition, there were four former officials of the Ministry of
Home Affairs identified as Progressives.17  Of the leading prewar
bureaucrats, those who had been purged under the occupation of
course had good reason to be hostile to the new Constitution. 8
The implications of this peculiar composition of the groups working
for total revision of the 1947 Constitution soon became evident. Ide-
ological and emotional divisions developed between prewar and post-
war party politicians. Generally speaking, majorities of the Progres-
sive Party (later Democratic Party) and of the Ryokuffikai (green
breeze society) and a minority in the Liberal Party were in favor of
this type of revisionism. A majority in the Liberal Party, led by
'The Liberals were Katsuroku Aikawa, Sensuke Fujieda, Seiz6 Kat6, Yasumi
Kurogane, Yoshio Mochinaga, Hirokichi Nadao, Kenji Tomita, Takao Hamada,
K6shir6 Ueki, and Iwao Yamazaki. The Progressives were Yoshimi Furui, Kiyoshi
Ikeda, Kingo Machimura, and Mikio Tatebayashi. See Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 8, 1953.
'For example, of those mentioned in note 67, the following had been purged:




Yoshida, adopted a generally negative attitude towards total revision.
As soon as the Progressive Party was established in February 1952,
it committed itself to total revision of the Constitution at the earliest
possible time. Point Five of its original platform called for total recon-
sideration of the laws and institutions established under the occupa-
tion, explicitly including constitutional revision. 9 Notwithstanding
intra-party factionalism, this line was followed consistently with a
remarkable degree of unanimity even after the Progressives were
joined by the Hatoyama Liberals to form the Democratic Party in
November 1954."0 The policy program of the Democratic Party reit-
erated the same revisionist plans and further urged the establishment
of an official commission to prepare a draft revision.7
In sharp contrast to the outspoken revisionist line adopted by the
Progressives and Democrats, Yoshida's negative attitude toward early
constitutional revision remained consistent throughout the post-inde-
pendence years up to the merger of 1955 and, indeed, long after that.
On the eve of the merger, for example, he publicly stated that he was
still firmly opposed to an early revision. 2 But despite the pressure
exerted by Yoshida, the Liberal Party's committee on the Constitution
(kempi-chisakai) was established in December 1953. By November
of the following year it had drafted the revisionist document, "the
outline of the revision of the Constitution of Japan" (nikon koku
kempd kaiseian yiki-an).7" However, the committee's work was
abruptly interrupted in November 1954 when the anti-Yoshida fac-
tions led by Hatoyama and Kishi walked out to join the Democratic
Party. In the ten-point policy program prepared for the general elec-
tion of February 1955 the top executives of the party (who had been
hand-picked by Yoshida) declared that no immediate attempt at con-
For the text of the six-point platform, see Y. MIYAMOTO, supra note 24, at 181-82.
7o While the party's annual conference in January 1954 officially resolved to work
towards creation of a Diet committee for a total re-examination of the Constitution
with a view to early revision, the two large factions in the party also expressed
revisionist views on several occasions. In November 1953, for example, about thirty
members of the "radical" faction, led by Kitamura, decided to press the party leader-
ship to take a "more positive" attitude towards the issue and the same group called
for the establishment of a nonpartisan Diet members' league for constitutional revision
in February 1954. In the meantime, the "neutral" faction, led by Furui, Machimura,
and others, included total revision of the Constitution in the program of the intraparty
group, D6yflkai, formed in February 1954. See Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 7, 1953; id., Feb.
3, 1954.
" See text at p. 938 supra.
,2 Mainichi Shimbun, Aug. 16, 1955. See also 4 S. YOSHIDA, KAIS6 JONEN (Rem-
iniscences of the ten years) 170-85 (1958).
" Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 19, 1954. For a discussion of its significance, see 1 I. SAT6,
KEMP6 KENKYO NYOMON (Introduction to the study of the Constitution) 58-61
(1964).
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stitutional revision would be made.74 In the course of the same elec-
tion campaign Taketora Ogata, who had just succeeded Yoshida,
charged Hatoyama, the Prime Minister and President of the Demo-
cratic Party, with contemplating constitutional revision as a means
of reinstituting conscription.75
Another interesting aspect of this type of revisionism was that, de-
spite the above-mentioned differences between the leaders of the
two conservative parties, the groups supporting the movement re-
cruited members from both parties. Indeed members were drawn from
all of the conservative parties. For example, the group which met on
November 6, 1953, to form an association for the study of constitti-
tional revision (kempt-kaisei kenkyfikai) included at least two Lib-
erals, six Progressives, one separatist Liberal, one ryokunfikai member
and one sktkaika-kurabu (minor parties club) member.76 In other
words, the movement had a bipartisan composition and this was no
doubt why it soon became inseparably related to the movement for
the unification of the conservative parties.
The same groups of prewar bureaucrats and politicians were behind
both the revisionist and the unification movements. It is quite natural
that this should have been so, since the primary objective of both
movements was to change the status quo identified with the occupation
regime and Yoshida's rule. Furthermore, one was clearly used as a
means of achieving the other. No other man personified as dramatic-
ally as Nobusuke Kishi the correlation between the two movements.
Even before his election to the House of Representatives in April
1953, Kishi had been known for his avowed interest in a drastic
change in the political arrangements established under the occupation.
As soon as he was freed from the restrictions of the purge towards the
end of 1952 he formed the Nihon saiken renmei (Japan reconstruction
league), which had constitutional revision as one of its principal ob-
jectives.77 In November 1953, Kishi's close friends met at his invita-
tion to discuss the possibilities of uniting the three conservative parties
in order to achieve constitutional revision.7 8 Five months later he was
one of the anonymous sponsors of the Hoshu-shinti yfishi kondankai
(volunteers' meeting for the creation of a new conservative party).
,Asahi Shimbun, Dec. 30, 1954; id., Dec. 31, 1954.
Mainichi Shimbun, Dec. 22, 1954.
"'Asah Shimbun, Nov. 7, 1953.
S. YOSHIMomo, KIsHT NOBuSUKE DEN (Biography of Nobusuke Kishi) 140-41
(1957).1, Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 9, 1953 (evening ed.).
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The forty-four participating Liberals adopted a five-point draft plat-
form for the would-be new party, which included revision of the
"occupation-made Constitution. 79
It should not be assumed that the differences of attitude among the
conservative parties regarding the merger of the conservative parties
strictly correlated with the divisions of opinion on the issue of consti-
tutional revision. It is nevertheless significant that the groups most
consistently revisionist-i.e., the Kishi, Ishibashi and former "Neutral"
factions in the Democratic Party-provided the prime motivation for
the merger movement as well. Moreover, the Yoshida faction in the
Liberal Party, persistently opposed to merger, was also known to be
least interested in constitutional revision. 0
One may regard the formation of the LDP in November 1955 as the
culmination of the extreme emotional version of revisionism in the
post-independence period. It is also testimony to the success of the
movement's proponents both in and out of the conservative parties.
It is, therefore, not at all surprising that the LDP officially committed
itself to the achievement of the earliest possible constitutional revi-
sion." l No more unexpected was the immediate establishment in the
party of a committee on the constitution (kempdi ch5sakai) and the
Cabinet Commission on the Constitution shortly afterwards. What
was surprising is that, as earlier pointed out, despite all these seem-
ingly promising developments revisionism has steadily declined in-
stead of prospering. In the following pages we shall attempt to explain
this failure of revisionism in the period following the merger.
III. THE FAILURE OF REVISIONISM
It should first be noted that public opinion, as clearly reflected in
the results of Diet elections since 1955, is not strongly in favor of
revision. As mentioned earlier, the Socialists, reinforced by the other
smaller opposition parties, have managed to secure over one-third of
the seats in both Houses of the Diet. Thus it is theoretically impossible
for the LDP to force a revision bill through the legislature even if they
so desired. The situation in the Diet is also reflected in expressions of
public opinion. Opinion polls conducted by various organizations re-
vealed two noteworthy trends: (1) Until about 1956 the revisionsists
'9 The other two anonymous sponsors were the party's vice-president, Ogata, and
Tanzan Ishibashi. See id., April 15, 1954.
'Id., June 13, 1955.
9
'JIMINT6-SHI HENSAN IINKAI, supra note 30, at 22-23.
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had enjoyed somewhat greater grass roots support than the anti-
revisionists, but this balance has since been reversed; and (2) "don't
know" and "undecided" responses have registered consistently high
percentages. 2 Neither of these trends encourage hasty attempts at
revision.
The public attitude, as reflected in the results of both opinion polls
and Diet elections, would explain to the satisfaction of most observers
why the LDP's performance on the revision issue has been unimpres-
sive in the thirteen years since its formation. There remains an under-
lying question, however: What has then been responsible for these
trends in the public attitude?
In addition to the obvious existence of inertia which favors the
maintenance of the status quo rather than drastic change, another
probable factor has been the logical implications of radical revisionism
itself.
As already noted, the call for a total revision was mainly justified
by references to the peculiar circumstances in which the 1947 Consti-
tution was drafted and then "imposed" on the "reluctant" Japanese
government and people. 3 Logically, revision on this ground had to
be total, potentially involving every chapter and article. This complete
ideological repudiation of the new Constitution had to rely on a highly
emotional and nationalistic reaction for sustained support. In reality,
however, nationalism since the San Francisco Peace Treaty has been
much more pragmatic than emotional and no virulent reaction has
been forthcoming. Not only have the masses refused to dance to the
tune of the extreme revisionists, but they have been positively antag-
onized. 4
It may be useful to recall that this kind of revisionism has from
the beginning been intimately associated with groups of prewar bu-
reaucrats. The generally negative reaction of public opinion indicates
'See KOBAYASHI, supra note 15, at 406-07, and Fukui, supra note 44, at 33.
' See, e.g., Yamazaki's statement of February 16, 1956, accompanying his intro-
duction of the Commission on the Constitution Bill in the House of Representatives,
in Asahi Shimbun, Feb. 16, 1956 (evening ed.).
" It should be added that the potential reservoir of support in the press was also
damaged. According to Kido, in 1954, 25 of the 40 dailies that carried editorials on
the constitutional issue were generally revisionist and only 8 were opposed to revi-
sion explicitly. After the House of Representatives election of February 1955, how-
ever, the majority became much more cautious, emphasizing the need to maintain
the basic principles of the new Constitution. In 1956, only 5 of the 34 dailies carrying
editorials on the issue were clearly revisionist, 6 were explicitly anti-revisionist, and 23
were noncommittal. Since then this pattern has remained consistent. See Y. Kido,
Kaiken-mondai to janarizuinu (The problem of constitutional revision and journalism),
in 2 KEmP6-moNDAI KEYI 'KOAI 133-44 (1965).
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to a certain extent the psychological gap which exists not only between
prewar and postwar generations but also between the bureaucratic
elite and masses. The failure of the former to obtain sustained support
for their impassioned drive for constitutional revision merely reflects
their failure to fill that psychological gap. The masses, consciously or
unconsciously, have identified themselves as beneficiaries, rather than
victims, of the occupation regime and the new Constitution.
Just as significantly, the introduction of this emotional type of
revisionism close on the heels of its more pragmatic counterparts
created a great deal of confusion. Whatever elements of specificity and
particularity had previously existed were replaced by sweeping gen-
eralities and emotionalism. It has therefore become increasingly diffi-
cult to discuss "constitutional revision" without all the emotional and
ideological connotations which those words have come to acquire.
Indeed it has even become difficult to distinguish the three different
types of revisionism. This situation has no doubt been largely respon-
sible for the high percentage of "don't know's" and "undecided" re-
sponses in the opinion surveys.
The development of the revision issue in the LDP after 1955 and in
the Commission on the Constitution between 1957 and 1964 may best
be understood in light of the above-mentioned implications of extreme
revisionism and the adverse trends in public opinion which it has
caused.
Originally, the main support for the LDP committee on the Consti-
tution came from the groups of prewar bureaucrats and politicians,
such as Kishi and Hatoyama. However, prewar elements, including
the leading prewar bureaucrats, declined in importance as a conserva-
tive force as their numbers in the Diet were steadily decreased and
their role in the decision-making processes of the party was appreciably
reduced.8 5 Under these changed circumstances the committee was
gradually divested of the emotional influence of the prewar men. A
new generation began to exercise control although the younger men
were also former high-ranking bureaucrats, such as Kiichi Aichi,
Naomi Nishimura and Uichi Noda.8 6 The predominance of these
bureaucrats was maintained as late as the end of 1965 when nearly a
' See Fukui, supra note 44, at 37.
"JIYI'MINS1UT6, SEIMU-CHOSAKAI MEIBO: SH6WA-40-NEN I1-GATSU 10-KA GENZAI
(The list of the members of the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council: as of No-
vember 10, 1965) 27-28 (1965).
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half of the committee members were drawn from this particular
category of LDP membership."
Perhaps more important for- the purposes of our discussion is the
subtle change of emphasis which has been taking place among this
newer group of former bureaucrats turned politicians. Whether due
to the election results or a genuine change of mind, by the time the
Commission on the Constitution Bill was passed in mid-1956 the
majority of revisionists in the LDP had come to realize that the goal
of total revision could not and probably need not be achieved.
In the course of the deliberations in the Commission, often marked
by acrimony, dogmatism and uncertainties, it gradually became ap-
parent that the ideological, fundamentalist revisionism was now cham-
pioned not so much by the LDP-affiliated Diet members as by a few
scholar-ideologues, such as Kamikawa, Onishi and Yagi. 8s It is true
and significant that most of the former bureaucrats of the Ministry
of Home Affairs, who had led the extreme revisionist movement in its
earlier phase, remained consistent in their commitments to total revi-
sion. It is just as significant, however, that the majority of the LDP-
affiliated Commission members now advocated partial and limited
revision.89 When they signed the "joint memorandum" initiated by
Yagi, Onishi, and others, they did so as supporters, rather than as
authors or initiators. The politicians were obviously more realistic
and pragmatic in the early 1960's than they or their colleagues had
been less than a decade before. Furthermore, this increasingly moder-
ate approach was echoed outside the Commission by a corresponding
change in the official LDP attitude towards the issue.
The change in attitude of the LDP's top leadership groups has been
reflected in the occasional public pronouncements made by the party
in connection with Diet elections and annual party conferences. Al-
though reference has been made to the issue in a number of these
pronouncements, the essential arguments have been a reiteration of
'As of November 1965, 48% of the committee's members were of this category,
as compared with 8% for lawyers, 3% for journalists, and 25% for miscellaneous.
These figures are derived from cross-checking data in, id.; SHcGIINGIIN MEIKAN(List of members of the House of Representatives) and KizoicuiN SANGIIN GUN MEI-
KAN (List of members of the House of Peers and House of Councillors) volumes of
SHOGIN & SANGIN, supra note 11, op. cit., passin.; and Y. KIIUOICA (ed.), KoicKAI
BINRAN (Handbook on the Diet) 99-150 (31st ed. 1965).
"' For a survey of the major groupings in the Commission, see Ward, supra note
41 at 407-15; R Arikura, "Ch, sa" no gakuinonteki-igi to seijiteki-igi (The aca-
demic meaning and the political meaning of the investigation), in KEmP6-CH6SAKAI
S6HIHAN: IEMPO-KAISEI-MONDAI NO HONSHITSU, Lupra note 15, at 27-29; Tokyo
Shimbun, Jan. 9, 1963.
' See sources cited at note 88, supra.
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points previously made. ° Furthermore, the general tone of the argu-
ments presented has become progressively more moderate and ambig-
uous.
The official organ of the party's Policy Affairs Research Council,
Seisaku Geppi, has carried a fair number of solidly revisionist theses,
as if to make up for the inaction of the party executives. A careful
examination of these theses shows, however, that a majority have
been written by a single theoretician on the staff of the Council, Yoshio
Miyamoto.9" Although many of his revisionist arguments are per-
suasive, they impress the reader more because of their increasing mod-
eration and eclecticism than because of their consistent emphasis on
extreme revisionism. 2
Despite, however, this important change which has doubtless oc-
curred at the leadership and rank and file levels, the LDP has contin-
ued to justify its greatly moderated revisionist position by references
to the circumstances under which the 1947 Constitution was drafted.
This indirect call for total revision is obviously in conflict with the
LDP's changed position and yet the party persists in repeating it.
Possibly this has been done more out of habit than out of a belief
that it provides the most persuasive argument for revision.
This combination of incompatible approaches, one pointing to an
increasingly moderate and pragmatic demand for specific and limited
amendments, the other logically requiring total and complete rewriting
of the new Constitution, has caused as much confusion in the Com-
mission on the Constitution and the LDP as it has in the mind of the
man in the street.
In the Commission the division between the few ideologues genuinely
and consistently committed to total revision and the majority of the
LDP-affiliated members was, to say the least, blurred. By the same
token, the official pronouncements of the LDP concerning the issue
became by the early 1960's a hodgepodge of two incompatible propo-
sitions. For example, the party's July 1962 platform contained the
following four points regarding the question of constitutional revision:
(i) In view of the fact that the present Constitution of Japan has been
'For the texts of these pronouncements, see JIYOMNSHUT6 KEMP6-C11OSAKAI,
KEMP6-KANKEI SHIRY6 (Materials relating the Constitution prepared by the LDP's
committee on the Constitution) 5-16 (Nov. 1964) (mimeo.).
" Of the nineteen signed theses on the constitutional issue printed in the first 127
issues of the monthly organ (January 1956 to August 1966), Miyamoto contributed
ten.
"See especially his Kemp5-kaisei hantai ron hihan (critique of the opposition
to constitutional revision) in the July 1965, and subsequent issues.
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established under an occupation administration, it was natural that it
should be reconsidered freely by the Japanese people themselves and
amended in such a way as to make it better conform to the changing
conditions of the nation's requirements;
(ii) Since, however, the issue was of utmost seriousness in its impli-
cations for the nation's future, the actual substance and timing of the
revision must be studied with great care and caution;
(iii) The actual substance of the revision to be effected must not be
determined before the Commission on the Constitution produced its final
reports and then only in such a manner as to reflect the unified will of
the people; and
(iv) The prospective revision did not and should not aim at restoring
the principles of imperial sovereignty or the prewar family system,
instituting conscription, or suppressing the fundamental human rights.93
Nothing shows more clearly than these juxtaposed promises the dilem-
ma presented to LDP policy-makers by their refusal to refrain from
condemning the undemocratic circumstances surrounding the birth of
the 1947 Constitution and their desire to ask for only limited revision
at the most.
The last important aspect of the revisionist movement to be consid-
ered is its factional background. It has already been mentioned that
during the Liberal Party's ascendancy and Yoshida's rule the strong-
est revisionist pressure emanated from the Progressives and Demo-
crats and the anti-Yoshida minority factions in the Liberal Party.
After the unification of these conservative parties into the LDP in
1955, the elements of factionalism continued to influence the develop-
ment of the issue within the newly unified party.
The logic of factionalism in the conservative parties, especially the
LDP, dictates that the dominant faction or factions (those in control
of the top party positions) avoid raising issues that may intensify
intra-party disunity and conflict with opposition parties. Their goal
is to maintain the existing balance between the parties and within
their own party so as to perpetuate their hegemony. On the other hand,
the same logic dictates that a dissident faction or factions (those
excluded from the most prized party positions) do exactly the oppo-
site, to cause the existing balance of power to change as quickly as
possible. This logic has no doubt influenced the pattern of support for
the revisionist movement in the LDP, as we shall briefly discuss below.
Immediately following the merger, those associated mainly with the
'JIYOMINSHUT6, ZENSHIN SURU NIHON: SEISAKU KAISETSU (Japan that advances:
explanation of policies) 316-19 (1962).
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anti-Hatoyama coalition of dissident factions, the Jikyoku-kondankai,
were potentially the most devoted revisionists in the LDP.9" Because
this coalition was led by the Yoshida faction many members tended to
keep relatively silent in the following few years. More outspoken
advocacy of immediate and total constitutional revision would have
embarrassed the majority in that faction, who had an anti-revisionist
record, and consequently would have undermined the unity and effec-
tiveness of the coalition which had been built over another controver-
sial issue, normalization of diplomatic relations with the USSR.
After the LDP's presidential contest in December 1956, many of the
revisionists were associated with two dissident factions led respectively
by Kishi and Ishii .1 5 Two months later, however, Kishi replaced
Ishibashi as Prime Minister and his faction acquired dominance. The
revisionists associated with the Kishi faction were placed in a position
where it was unwise to press the revision issue too strongly. On the
other hand, the aggressively revisionist elements in the Ishii faction
found it impossible to launch an effective campaign by themselves
because of the minority position of their faction.
When Kishi was replaced by Ikeda in the wake of the anti-Security
Treaty riots of 1960, the resulting changes in the interfactional posi-
tions freed the revisionists in the Kishi faction from the restrictions
inherent in the dominant factional position. It became not only possi-
ble but tactically desirable for them to raise the controversial issue.
Under these changed circumstances they attempted to revitalize the
party committee on the Constitution as an effective base for their
activities. Their attempt failed, however, precisely because of its fac-
tional implications. Like most other formal party organs the commit-
tee was under the effective control of the dominant factions. In the
spring of 1964, for example, the Fukuda (former Kishi) and the Ishii
factions combined contributed only about 17 percent of the commit-
tee's members and the addition of the generally sympathetic Sat6
faction would not bring this percentage above 30 percent. 6 For this
reason they were then compelled to turn to the possibilities of building
For a list of the jikyoku-kondankai members, see T. WATANABE, HABATS':
,NIHON' HOSHUT6 NO BUNSEKI (Factions: an analysis of the conservative parties in
Japan) 24-25 (1964) ; and Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 26, 1956.
'For a discussion of membership characteristics of these two factions, see
WATANABE, supra note 94, at 99-105, 130-35.
"'These figures are derived by cross-checking JIYOMINSHUTO SEEMU-CHOSAKAI
-MEIBO: SHOWA-39-NEN 3-GATSU 1-JITSU-GENZAI (The list of the members of the LDP's
Policy Affairs Research Council: as of March 1, 1964) 27-29 (1964), and Y. KiKu-
OKA (ed.), KOKKAI LONRAN (Handbook on the Diet) 326-29 (26th ed. 1964).
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a new and informal intra-party group, soskinkai, as a substitute for
the official committee on the Constitution.
The most recent bastion of the revisionist movement in the LDP,
which was thus built initially under the dominant influence of three
dissident factions (Fukuda, Ishii and Sat6) 97 could conceivably have
proven effective in articulating such revisionist sentiment as existed
in the party. However, its purpose has been largely defeated, once
again by the same familiar logic of factionalism. In November 1964,
Sat5 succeeded the ailing Ikeda as the party's new President and
Prime Minister and, as a result, the two revisionist factions led by
Fukuda and Ishii joined Sat6's as the core of the new dominant fac-
tional alliance. Since that time the revisionists have chosen to keep
discreetly silent on the issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, there have been good reasons for the apparent
decline of militant revisionism in the LDP since 1955. The emotional
and ideological character of the third type of revisionism, which be-
came the dominant form after the San Francisco Peace Treaty, not
only frightened away many who would have supported a more limited
revision program but also introduced elements of confusion and un-
certainly. Support for the revisionist movement was further eroded by
factionalism within the conservative parties. As it stands today, the
goal of constitutional revision, whether partial or total, seems farther
away, rather than closer, than it was thirteen years ago. One may even
conclude that extreme revisionism is dead. No significant group in
present-day Japan seems to be seriously interested in working for
total rewriting of the "occupation-made" Constitution against the for-
midable odds described in the foregoing pages. Indeed, there seems to
be little hope for any kind of revision in the immediate future. The
continued success of the opposition parties in controlling over one-
'
TThe percentages of the members of these two factions officially associated with
the group in 1936 were 37.5% and 35.7%, respectively, both being more than twice as
high as that of any other faction. Between them they constituted 35% of the group's
identifiable members with seats in the House of Representatives, a ratio which is
quite remarkable considering that their combined share of the LPD-affiliated mem-
bers of the House at the time was a mere 13.6%. If one adds the Sat6 faction's
share of 17.5%, the three dissident factions easily controlled a majority of soshinkai's
members. Information relevant to this generalization was derived from SoSHiNKAi,
SOSHINKAI TO WA? (What is Soshinkai?) (July f963); KoxUMIN SEIJI NENKAN 1962
(Yearbook of politics for the nationals) at 602; SHIJGIIN GuN MEIKAN and KIZOKUIN
SANGIIN GUN MEIKAN, supra note 87; and Y. KIKUOKA (ed.), KOKKAI BINRAN 97-150
(25th ed. 1963).
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third of the votes in both Houses of the Diet makes revision technic-
ally impossible and this balance of power in the Diet is not likely to
change drastically in the foreseeable future.
In the long run, however, a series of important changes might occur
in the ideological atmosphere to change the nature and scope of sup-
port for some type of revisionist program. To be sufficiently effective
to bring about actual constitutional revision these changes would have
to include at least the following two developments: Conscious isola-
tion and identification of the different types of revision, and concen-
tration of revisionist efforts on achieving the first type on strictly
pragmatic grounds. These changes will no doubt be hard to achieve,
but they must be achieved if existing ideological and emotional barri-
ers to revision are to be overcome. Without such changes there will be
no constitutional revision for a long time to come.
